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OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
  A jury found Richard Antonio Hodge guilty of ten 
counts of federal and Virgin Islands offenses, including 
robbery, assault, firearms-related crimes, and reckless 
endangerment.  Hodge appeals his conviction and sentence on 
the following grounds:  double jeopardy, denial of his pretrial 
motion to substitute counsel, denial of his motion to strike three 
jurors for cause, admission of prejudicial evidence at trial, 
insufficiency of the evidence, and error in the jury instructions.   
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For the reasons that follow, we agree that Hodge’s 
multiple convictions under 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a), a Virgin 
Islands firearms statute, violated his right against double 
jeopardy.  Therefore, we will remand to the District Court to 
vacate the convictions as to the appropriate counts and for 
requisite resentencing.  We will otherwise affirm. 
 
I. 
A. 
On December 3, 2013, Asim Powell, an employee of 
Ranger American Armored Services (“Ranger”), was carrying 
a bag containing $33,550 in cash deposits from a K-Mart in St. 
Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands to a Ranger armored vehicle 
in the K-Mart parking lot.  On his way, Powell met his 
supervisor Clement Bougouneau.  While the two were standing 
in the parking lot, a man, whose face was partially covered, 
shot Powell in the back and attempted to seize the bag of 
money.  Powell did not relent, and the man then shot him twice 
more, in the wrist and hip.  The man then shot Bougouneau 
once in the groin and fled the scene with the bag.  Latoya 
Schneider, an off-duty Virgin Islands police officer, happened 
to be at the shopping center at the time and recognized Hodge 
as the shooter.  Hodge was later apprehended.  Both Powell and 
Bougouneau survived the shootings.   
 
On January 2, 2014, a fifteen-count Information was 
filed against Hodge in the District of the Virgin Islands:   
 
− Count 1, Interference with Commerce by 
Robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951;  
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− Count 2, Use and Discharge of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Crime of 
Violence (robbery), 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A);  
− Count 3, Use and Discharge of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Crime of 
Violence (attempted murder of Powell), 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A);  
− Count 4, Use and Discharge of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Crime of 
Violence (attempted murder of 
Bougouneau), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A);  
− Count 5, Attempted First Degree Murder 
of Powell, 14 V.I.C. §§ 921, 922(a)(2), 
and 331;  
− Count 6, Using an Unlicensed Firearm 
During Commission of a Crime of 
Violence (attempted murder of Powell), 
14 V.I.C. § 2253(a);  
− Count 7, Using an Unlicensed Firearm 
During Commission of a Crime of 
Violence (first degree assault of Powell), 
14 V.I.C. § 2253(a);  
− Count 8, Using an Unlicensed Firearm 
During Commission of a Crime of 
Violence (robbery of Powell), 14 V.I.C. § 
2253(a);  
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− Count 9, First Degree Assault with Intent 
to Commit Murder (Powell), 14 V.I.C. § 
295(1);  
− Count 10, First Degree Assault with 
Intent to Commit Murder (Powell), 14 
V.I.C. § 295(3) [sic];  
− Count 11, First Degree Robbery of 
Powell, 14 V.I.C. §§ 1861 and 1862(1);  
− Count 12, Attempted First Degree Murder 
of Bougouneau, 14 V.I.C. §§ 921, 
922(a)(2), and 331;  
− Count 13, Using an Unlicensed Firearm 
During Commission of a Crime of 
Violence (attempted murder of 
Bougouneau), 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a);  
− Count 14, First Degree Assault with 
Intent to Commit Murder (Bougouneau), 
14 V.I.C. § 295(1); and 
− Count 15, Reckless Endangerment in the 
First Degree, 14 V.I.C. § 625(a).  
Appendix (“App.”) 13-28.  The District Court dismissed Count 
10 prior to trial because it contained an error.   
 
B. 
 Hodge was represented by Federal Public Defender 
Omodare Jupiter.  Prior to trial, Hodge indicated he wanted 
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substitute counsel, but none was arranged at that time.1  On the 
morning of the first day of trial, June 9, 2014, Hodge moved to 
substitute attorney Michael Joseph for Jupiter, and Joseph 
submitted a faxed motion to appear on Hodge’s behalf.  Jupiter 
reported to the District Court that Hodge wished to have Joseph 
represent him at trial.   
 
The District Court engaged in the following colloquy 
with Jupiter: 
 
THE COURT: Are you aware -- is there 
some conflict between you and your 
client? 
MR. JUPITER: There’s no conflict that I 
-- 
THE COURT: Any other substantial 
reason that you cannot represent Mr. 
Hodge? 
MR. JUPITER: No, Your Honor. The 
only issue -- 
THE COURT: It’s just a question of 
choice, then? 
MR. JUPITER: This is only a question of 
whether -- I think the only issue I want to 
make sure that the Court -- the record is 
clear, the only issue the Court raised is 
                                              
1 At a prior motions hearing, Jupiter alerted the District Court 
that Hodge wished to be represented by substitute counsel.  
However, the transcript of that hearing is devoid of any 
substantive discussion as to the rationale, timing, or other 
details of the request. 
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whether or not he has a right to his 
counsel of choice, Your Honor. And so 
no, I’m not aware of any conflict that I 
have with Mr. Hodge. I was not aware 
until Sunday, yesterday, that Mr. Joseph 
was going to be trying to enter his 
appearance in this case. 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you 
communicating with your client? 
MR. JUPITER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is your client 
communicating with you? 
MR. JUPITER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you have no conflict 
with your client at this time, correct? 
MR. JUPITER: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there any conflict of 
interest, are you representing some other 
entity, Ranger American, or have any 
relationship with anyone? 
MR. JUPITER: Not at all. 
THE COURT: I don’t find there’s any 
good cause for any continuance, which is 
the only way I think Attorney Joseph can 
come in and adequately represent the 
defendant in this case.  
 
App. 37-39.  Joseph confirmed to the Court that while he would 
prefer more time, he was ready to proceed with jury selection 
and that his only request was to begin opening statements the 
next morning.  The District Court did not directly ask Hodge 
any questions.  After the Government indicated its concern 
about Hodge’s right to counsel, the District Court denied the 
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motion.  The court noted that it did not “see any good cause for 
a continuance . . . [or] for substituting counsel,” and concluded 
that the motion was “simply a matter of choice, and what the 
Court views what may come close to kind of tactically moving 
the trial around.”  App. 43-44.  The court characterized 
Joseph’s recitation as “at best . . . equivocal when it comes to 
his preparedness for trial,” App. 42, and concluded that “a 
continuance would be required in the Court’s view in order to 
allow Attorney Joseph to represent the defendant,” App. 43.2  
The court then advised Hodge that his options were to proceed 
with Jupiter or to represent himself.  Hodge opted to proceed 
with Jupiter as his counsel.   
 
C. 
During jury selection, several prospective jurors 
revealed their relationships with witnesses or parties in the 
case.  Hodge urged the District Court to excuse three 
prospective jurors for cause.   
 
First, Hodge challenged Juror 18, who indicated she 
was a childhood friend of Bougouneau and that they speak 
occasionally when they see each other, especially at work.  She 
stated that she works at a bank and that she has overheard 
employees of Ranger discussing the case.   
 
Second, Hodge challenged Juror 59, who stated she 
knew both Bougouneau and Powell through working at a bank 
that uses Ranger for transporting money. 
                                              
2 Jury selection took place immediately after this colloquy 
regarding counsel.  Opening statements began shortly after 
noon that same day. 
9 
 
Third and finally, Hodge challenged Juror 24, who 
stated that her father was killed 22 years earlier and that “it still 
hurts [her] because the criminals are out running.”  App. 60.  
Juror 24 also was acquainted with Schneider.     
 
The court refused to excuse any of the three prospective 
jurors for cause on the basis that all three stated that they could 
be fair and impartial, and because “[i]t’s a very small 
community.”  App. 67.  Hodge then exercised his peremptory 
strikes to remove Jurors 18, 59, and 24 from the jury.  
 
D. 
Hodge’s jury trial took place on June 9, 10, and 11, 
2014.  Below, we summarize the statements and evidence 
presented at trial that relate to the issues raised on appeal.   
 
Both Powell and Bougouneau testified at trial, although 
neither could directly identify Hodge.  Powell testified that 
while he was conversing with Bougouneau in the K-Mart 
parking lot, Bougouneau shouted “[w]atch out,” and Powell 
felt a “sharp pain in [his] back.”  Supplemental Appendix 
(“Supp. App.”) 18.  Powell fell forward bleeding from the 
chest.  Supp. App. 18.  Next, Powell heard several more shots 
and “felt somebody pulling at the bag” of cash deposits from 
the K-Mart that he had in his hand.  Supp. App. 18.  Powell 
“tried to restrain by not letting go the bag,” and “felt a shot in 
[his] hip.”  Supp. App. 18.  He also felt a shot in his wrist.  
Supp. App. 19.  Powell testified that two to three minutes 
elapsed between when he was shot and when the money bag 
he was holding was “wrestled” from him.  June 9, 2014 Trial 
Tr. (D. Ct. Dkt. No. 66) at 112. 
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Bougouneau testified that he saw Powell leaving the K-
Mart and approaching him.  Bougouneau confirmed that he 
“saw the gun pull up behind Powell,” and that he said “[l]ook 
out.”  Supp. App. 21.  He testified that the assailant’s hair and 
face were covered.  Supp. App. 22; June 9, 2014 Trial Tr. at 
143.  Bougouneau testified that “by the time I tried to grab my 
gun, shots fired and I go down.”  Supp. App. 21.  At some 
point, Bougouneau was shot.  Supp. App. 20.  Bougouneau 
then ran after the assailant along with Schneider.  Supp. App. 
24.  
 
Schneider identified Hodge as the shooter.  She testified 
that on the day of the crime, she was off-duty from her position 
as a Virgin Islands police officer and was working as a taxi 
driver when she saw Hodge, whom she knew as “Richie,” in 
the K-Mart parking lot.  The Government asked Schneider how 
long she knew Hodge.  She responded: 
 
I’ve been a police [officer] for about nine years.  
I don’t know him personally, but, you know, my 
experience from working in special ops and 
dealing with the guys in the area, town, country, 
and all the different housing communities and 
stuff.  I gathered his name from, you know, my 
co-workers and stuff like that.  But I don’t 
personally know him. 
 
App. 76.  Schneider testified that her sister lives in the area and 
added, “I see him all the time.”  App. 76.   
 
Schneider testified that she saw Hodge in a “slow jog” 
and that at the time, she thought to herself, “Oh, Richie found 
a job” because she saw that Hodge had a hat or cloth over his 
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face and assumed it was to cover it from dust.  App. 75-76.  
The Government then asked Schneider how she knew Hodge 
was unemployed.  She replied, “Well, I always see him on the 
corner or on the turf, hanging with a group of guys,” and added 
that she had observed him “hanging” in the area for four or five 
years.  App. 76, 80.  Schneider testified that Hodge had “his 
hands in this big jacket” and that she found it “strange.”  App. 
77.  Schneider stated that when she turned to retrieve her 
service weapon, she heard “[m]ore than two” shots “ring off.”  
App. 77.  She testified that she next saw one of the victims 
falling, Hodge picking up a bag, and Hodge running with a gun 
in his hand.  App. 77-78.  Later, during closing statements, the 
Government referred to Schneider’s characterization of Hodge 
as previously unemployed and that she at first believed he had 
found a job.  Hodge did not object to Schneider’s testimony or 
to the Government’s statement during closing.    
 
Schneider and Bougouneau stopped their pursuit of 
Hodge because of Bougouneau’s gunshot wound.  Other 
officers arrived and eventually found Hodge in a dense wooded 
area, only half-dressed.  The officers recovered from the 
bushes nearby a tee shirt, a black ski mask, and the jacket 
identified by Schneider.  Gunpowder residue was later found 
on the clothing.  The ski mask had male DNA on it, but Hodge 
was excluded as a contributor to the DNA sample in the mask. 
 
E. 
The District Court instructed the jury before and after 
closing statements.  In the jury instructions before the closing 
statements, the District Court explained:   
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The crimes charged in this case are serious 
crimes which require proof of the defendant’s 
mental state or intent before he can be convicted.  
To establish mental state or intent, the 
government must prove that the defendant’s 
actions were knowingly and intentionally done. 
The government is not required to prove that the 
defendant knew that he was breaking the law 
when he did the acts charged in the information.  
You may determine his mental state or intent 
from all the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the case.  State of mind or knowledge ordinarily 
may only be proved indirectly, that is, by 
circumstantial evidence, because there’s no way 
we can get inside to observe the operations of the 
human mind. 
 
Supp. App. 50-51.   
 
 In instructing the jury as to Counts 3 and 4, the 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) counts relating to the attempted murders of 
Powell and Bougouneau, the court first stated: 
 
Counts 3 and 4 charge that on or about December 
3rd, 2013, the defendant used a firearm to 
commit attempted murder.   
 
To find the defendant guilty of using and 
discharging a firearm during the commission of 
attempted murder, the government must prove 
each of the following essential elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt:  
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First, that the defendant committed an attempted 
murder as charged in either Counts 5 or 12 of the 
information. 
 
Second, that during and in relation to the 
commission of that crime, the defendant 
knowingly used a firearm. 
 
Third, that the defendant used the firearm during 
and in relation to the crime of attempted murder.  
 
App. 90.  The court paused to address an unrelated matter, and 
then repeated the instruction as to Counts 3 and 4.  In the 
second iteration, the court did not specifically refer to “Counts 
5 or 12 of the information.”  App. 91.  It also replaced 
“knowingly used” with “knowingly discharged” in the second 
to last sentence of the instruction.  App. 92.  
 
The court then gave the jury instructions for Counts 5 
and 12 for attempted murder.  It stated: 
 
To meet its burden of proof for the crime charged 
in Counts 5 and 12, the government must prove 
the following essential elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt:   
 
First, that the defendant attempted to kill a 
human being. 
 
Second, that the defendant acted willfully, 
deliberately and with premeditation. 
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And third, that the defendant acted with malice 
aforethought. 
 
App. 92-93.  Next, the District Court specifically defined 
premeditation and malice aforethought: 
 
To premeditate a killing is to conceive the design 
or plan to kill. 
 
Malice aforethought may be inferred from 
circumstances which show a wanton and 
depraved spirit, a mind bent on evil mischief, 
without regard to its consequences. Malice 
aforethought does not mean simply hatred or 
particular ill will, but embraces generally the 
state of mind with which one commits a 
wrongful act. And it includes all those states of 
mind in which a homicide is committed without 
legal justification, extenuation or execution. 
 
App. 93-94. 
 
 The court then gave jury instructions for Counts 6 and 
13, the firearms offenses in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) 
with respect to attempted murder:   
 
To sustain its burden of proof for the crime 
charged in Counts 6 and 13, the government 
must prove the following essential elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
First, that the defendant knowingly used the 
firearm in question. 
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Second, that the defendant was not authorized by 
law to use the firearm in question. 
 
And third, that the defendant used the firearm 
during the commission of an attempted murder. 
 
App. 94-95.  
 
F. 
The jury returned a mixed verdict.  It acquitted Hodge 
of four counts:  Count 4, the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense as to 
the attempted murder of Bougouneau; Count 5, attempted first 
degree murder of Powell; Count 12, attempted first degree 
murder of Bougouneau; and Count 13, the 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) 
offense of using an unauthorized firearm in commission of the 
attempted murder of Bougouneau.  It convicted him of the 
remaining ten counts.   
 
On September 16, 2015, the District Court entered a 
judgment of conviction and sentence as to Counts 1, 2, and 3 
and a separate judgment and commitment as to Counts 6, 7, 8, 
9, 11, 14, and 15.  On Count 1 (Hobbs Act robbery of Powell), 
the court sentenced Hodge to seventy months of imprisonment.  
On Counts 2 and 3 (the § 924(c) counts related to the robbery 
and attempted murder of Powell), the court sentenced Hodge 
to a mandatory minimum of 300 months of imprisonment on 
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the second § 924(c) violation and 120 months of imprisonment 
for the initial violation,3 to run consecutively.  
 
As to the Virgin Islands offenses, the District Court 
sentenced Hodge to a fifteen-year general sentence on Counts 
6, 7 and 8 — the Virgin Islands firearms offenses related to the 
attempted murder, first degree assault, and robbery of Powell, 
respectively.  It sentenced Hodge to a five-year general 
sentence for Counts 9, 11, 14, and 15 — the first degree assault 
of Powell, first degree robbery of Powell, first degree assault 
of Bougouneau, and first degree reckless endangerment, 
respectively.  Both the five- and fifteen-year general sentences 
were to run consecutively to each other and to all other 
sentences.   
 
The District Court also issued an opinion on March 8, 
2016 regarding Counts 2 and 3, the dual § 924(c) convictions, 
rejecting Hodge’s position that the convictions were 
duplicative and that only one of the convictions could stand.  
The District Court also denied Hodge’s motion for a new trial 
and motion to vacate in a written opinion dated April 15, 2016.  
Hodge filed a timely appeal. 
                                              
3 Because the firearm in this case was discharged, the 
mandatory minimum for the first § 924(c) offense is ten years.  
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
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II.4 
Hodge raises separate arguments as to why several 
counts of his conviction and his sentence should be vacated 
because they are multiplicitous and violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause.5  The Fifth 
Amendment protects, inter alia, “against multiple punishments 
for the same offense imposed in a single proceeding,” Jones v. 
Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (quotation marks omitted), 
and accordingly, prohibits multiplicity.  We have observed that 
“[m]ultiplicity is the charging of a single offense in separate 
counts of the indictment.  A multiplicitous indictment risks 
subjecting a defendant to multiple sentences for the same 
offense, an obvious violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause’s 
protection against cumulative punishment.”  United States v. 
Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations 
omitted).  The Supreme Court has noted that “[b]ecause the 
substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine 
punishments is vested with the legislature, the question under 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 48 
U.S.C. § 1612 and 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
5 Hodge also argues that a few counts of his conviction and his 
sentence should be vacated by operation of an analog of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause — title 14, section 104 of the Virgin 
Islands Code.  Arguments implicating section 104 will be 
discussed infra.  When we are tasked with interpreting a 
territorial law under the Virgin Islands Code and there is no 
controlling precedent on point, “it is our role to predict how the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands would resolve this 
interpretive issue.”  United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 
227 n.12 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are 
‘multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent.”  Ohio v. 
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (citations omitted).  As a 
result, the sentencing discretion of the judicial branch is limited 
by the legislative branch in that courts must ensure that the 
punishment imposed upon a defendant does not surpass that 
prescribed by the legislature.  See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 
359, 366 (1983).    
 
In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), 
the Supreme Court provided a test to determine whether the 
legislature “intended that two statutory offenses be punished 
cumulatively.”  Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337 
(1981).  The Court in Blockburger directed that “where the 
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether 
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision 
requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”  
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.  See Ianelli v. United States, 420 
U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975) (explaining that the Blockburger test 
serves the “function of identifying congressional intent to 
impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the 
course of a single act or transaction”).  However, the 
Blockburger test is merely one “rule of statutory construction;” 
it does not control “where, for example, there is a clear 
indication of contrary legislative intent.”  Albernaz, 450 U.S. 
at 340 (quotation marks omitted).  
 
Generally, our review of double jeopardy and 
multiplicity rulings is plenary.  See Kennedy, 682 F.3d at 255 
n.8.  However, double jeopardy claims that were not raised 
before the District Court are reviewed for plain error.  United 
States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 55, 60 (3d Cir. 2008).  Under plain 
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error review, we will “grant relief only if we conclude that (1) 
there was an error, (2) the error was ‘clear or obvious,’ and (3) 
the error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights.’”  United 
States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).  When 
these three prongs have been satisfied, we may exercise our 
discretion to correct the forfeited error.  Id.     
 
We address Hodge’s double jeopardy claims in seriatim 
below and note where we conduct plain error review instead of 
plenary review. 
 
A. 
Hodge argues that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c) and 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) (the federal and Virgin 
Islands crime-of-violence firearms offenses, respectively) 
cannot both stand if they are based on the same predicate 
offense conduct.  There are two sets of convictions that fall into 
this category:  Counts 2 and 8, where Count 2 is the federal 
firearms offense and Count 8 is the local Virgin Islands 
firearms offense, both based on the robbery of Powell; and 
Counts 3 and 6, where Count 3 is the federal firearms offense 
and Count 6 is the local firearms offense, both based on the 
attempted murder of Powell.  Because Hodge did not raise this 
issue before the District Court, but did not appear to have 
intentionally waived it, we review it for plain error.  See United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993). 
 
As a preliminary matter, unlike a scenario where the 
dual sovereigns of a state government and the federal 
government pursue parallel prosecutions for the same conduct, 
“the Virgin Islands and the federal government are considered 
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one sovereignty for the purpose of determining whether an 
individual may be punished under both Virgin Islands and 
United States statutes for a similar offense growing out of the 
same occurrence.”  Gov’t of the V.I. v. Brathwaite, 782 F.2d 
399, 406 (3d Cir. 1986). This is because as a United States 
territory, the U.S. Virgin Islands “does not have independent 
sovereignty but derives such powers as its government 
possesses directly from congressional grant under article IV, 
section 3 of the federal Constitution.”  Gov’t of the V.I. v. 
Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 669 (3d Cir. 1980).   
 
 We therefore turn to the Blockburger test to analyze 
whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) “constitute 
violations of two distinct statutory provisions,” Blockburger, 
284 U.S. at 304.  The predicate offenses for Counts 2 and 8 
(robbery)6 and Counts 3 and 6 (attempted murder) are the 
same.  As a result, we need only examine the other elements of 
the two statutes. 
 
Because the federal and Virgin Islands firearms statutes 
each contain an element not found in the other, Counts 2 and 8 
and Counts 3 and 6 are not multiplicitous and do not trigger 
double jeopardy protection.  The Virgin Islands firearms 
statute, 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) requires that any firearm that is the 
                                              
6 While the Information is not clear as to which robbery charge 
Counts 2 and 8 refer to, the jury instructions indicate that both 
referred to the Virgin Islands first degree robbery statute in 
Count 11, rather than to the federal Hobbs Act robbery in 
Count 1.  App. 88-91, 96. 
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basis of the charge be “unauthorized.”7  The federal statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), on the other hand, does not require that the 
firearm be unauthorized.8 
                                              
7 Title 14, section 2253(a) of the Virgin Islands Code 
provides, in relevant part:  
 
Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, 
has, possesses, bears, transports or carries either, 
actually or constructively, openly or concealed 
any firearm . . . may be arrested without a 
warrant, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment 
of not less than ten years . . . except that . . . if 
such firearm or an imitation thereof was had, 
possessed, borne, transported or carried by or 
under the proximate control of such person 
during the commission or attempted commission 
of a crime of violence . . . then such person shall 
be fined $25,000 and imprisoned not less than 
fifteen (15) years nor more than twenty (20) 
years.  
 
8 Title 18, section 924(c) of the United States Code provides, 
in relevant part:  
 
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . 
uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance 
of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in 
addition to the punishment provided for such 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . 
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
less than 5 years . . . . In the case of a second or 
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The federal statute also possesses requirements that the 
Virgin Islands statute does not.  To prove a violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), a reasonable jury must find that the firearm 
was a “real” one.  See United States v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 271 
(3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570, 572 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  However, section 2253(a) explicitly provides that 
even an “imitation” of a firearm used during a crime of 
violence triggers criminal liability.  See United States v. 
Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
The offenses underlying Counts 2 and 8 contain at least 
one element that the other does not.  The same applies to 
Counts 3 and 6.  Therefore, under the Blockburger test, there 
was no double jeopardy when Hodge was convicted of both the 
federal 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count and the territorial 14 V.I.C. § 
2253(a) count based on the same predicate offenses.  
 
B. 
Hodge argues that the District Court erred in failing to 
dismiss one of the two federal convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c).  Hodge does not contend that the two convictions 
(Counts 2 and 3) violate the Blockburger test.  Hodge Br. 51.  
Instead, he argues more generally that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause “prevent[s] the sentencing court from prescribing 
greater punishment than the legislature intended,” United 
States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467, 470 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366), and that § 924(c) is at best ambiguous 
                                              
subsequent conviction under this subsection, the 
person shall . . . be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than 25 years.  
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as to whether he can be charged and sentenced under both 
Counts 2 and 3. 
 
Hodge contends that § 924(c) is ambiguous and can be 
read to mean that a single use, carrying, or possession of a 
firearm cannot support multiple prosecutions.  He urges that 
we should apply the rule of lenity to vacate either Count 2 or 3 
because the predicate offenses — one for robbery and one for 
attempted murder — are both based on a single use of his 
firearm in shooting Powell.   
 
 We disagree.  We have not held, as Hodge maintains, 
that the unit of prosecution for a § 924(c) count is each use of 
the firearm regardless of how many predicate offenses are 
charged.  Rather, we have held that “crimes occurring as part 
of the same underlying occurrence may constitute separate 
predicate offenses if properly charged as separate crimes.  It 
follows that each may be a separate predicate for a § 924(c)(1) 
conviction.”  United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 426 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).  
 
In Casiano, we rejected the argument that “§ 924(c) was 
never intended to punish subsequent convictions arising out of 
a single criminal enterprise involving the same victim.”  Id. at 
425.  The defendant’s co-conspirators in Casiano pistol-
whipped the victim while carjacking him, held a gun to his 
head while the victim lay in the back of the stolen vehicle, and 
pistol-whipped him again in the car.9  Id. at 423.  The defendant 
                                              
9 The assailants then shot at the victim twice after taking him 
to a remote location, but Casiano did not appear to have been 
charged based on the shooting.  Casiano, 113 F.3d at 423. 
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was convicted of two counts of § 924(c), one based on 
carjacking and one based on kidnapping.  Id. at 424.  The Court 
held that the application of § 924(c) to both was appropriate 
because the statute refers to a second or subsequent 
“conviction, not criminal episode.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993)).  
The same logic applies here, since the sequence of Hodge’s 
actions closely parallels Casiano’s and in both cases a firearm 
was employed multiple times to commit multiple predicate 
crimes.   
 
Hodge next argues that our decision in Diaz, 592 F.3d 
at 474-75, requires that the rule of lenity be applied to vacate 
his second § 924(c) conviction.  In Diaz, the defendant used a 
firearm multiple times to commit a single predicate act:  
possession with intent to distribute heroin.  Based on this single 
predicate offense, he was convicted of two § 924(c) offenses.  
After surveying the opinions of our sister Courts of Appeals 
and the relevant legislative history, we concluded that the 
statutory text of § 924(c) was “susceptible of differing 
interpretations” as to the issues in that case, id. at 473, with the 
relevant unit of prosecution being either (1) the underlying 
predicate offense, or (2) each individual instance in which a 
defendant uses or carries a firearm throughout the duration of 
an underlying predicate offense.  Id. at 471-72.  Given this 
ambiguity, we concluded that application of the rule of lenity 
would be appropriate in that particular case and vacated one 
count of the defendant’s two § 924(c) convictions.  Id. at 474-
75.     
 
 Hodge’s reliance on Diaz is misplaced.  Unlike the 
defendant in Diaz, who had two § 924(c) convictions on the 
basis of a single predicate crime, Hodge’s two § 924(c) 
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convictions were based on two separate predicate offenses:  
robbery and attempted murder.  The analysis regarding lenity 
in Diaz thus does not suggest its extension to this case.  This is 
because regardless of what constitutes the unit of prosecution, 
Hodge engaged in multiple uses of a firearm to commit 
multiple crimes, albeit all during the same criminal episode.10  
                                              
10 Even if the unit of prosecution for § 924(c) were based on 
each use of a firearm rather than the underlying predicate 
offense, Hodge’s argument would still fail because his 
characterization of Counts 2 and 3 as involving “use of a 
firearm once,” Hodge Br. 44, is factually incorrect.  Powell 
testified at trial that he was first shot and began bleeding from 
his chest before the assailant attempted to rob him of the money 
bag.  Supp. App. 18-19.  When Powell “tried to restrain by not 
letting go the bag,” he then “felt a shot in [his] hip.”  Supp. 
App. at 18.  Powell was subsequently shot a third time in the 
right wrist.  Supp. App. at 19.  Shooting Powell to rob him and 
then shooting him twice more when Powell refused to give up 
the money can rightly be understood on this record as 
constituting multiple “uses” of the firearm to commit different 
predicate crimes.  See United States v. Vichitvongsa, 819 F.3d 
260, 270 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Whether a criminal episode contains 
more than one unique and independent use, carry, or 
possession depends at least in part on whether the defendant 
made more than one choice to use, carry, or possess a 
firearm.”); United States v. Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 749 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (“[T]here may be circumstances in which such 
[multiple] offenses could support more than one § 924(c) 
charge — as where, for example, the evidence shows distinct 
uses of the firearm, first to intimidate and then to kill.”).  We 
therefore deem inapposite Hodge’s citations to out-of-circuit 
cases regarding truly simultaneous offenses based on a single 
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This scenario was neither at issue in nor contemplated by the 
Diaz Court.  To the contrary, the Diaz Court explicitly 
distinguished its particular factual scenario, reinforcing that 
Casiano would still control in a situation like that at issue here.  
See Diaz, 592 F.3d at 470 n.3 (“Casiano does not govern this 
case because the Government there charged more predicate 
crimes than § 924(c) violations.”); see also United States v. 
Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“In 
circumstances in which a defendant displays or fires a gun on 
separate and distinct occasions, the government will often be 
able to charge those acts as separate § 924(c) violations linked 
to separate predicate offenses.”).  Hodge’s argument — that a 
defendant commits only one § 924(c) violation despite 
multiple uses of a firearm to commit multiple crimes — is thus 
foreclosed by Casiano.  For this reason and because our 
holding in Diaz does not alter that conclusion, we will affirm 
the judgment as to Counts 2 and 3. 
 
                                              
use of a firearm.  See, e.g., Vichitvongsa, 819 F.3d at 269-70 
(vacating two of four § 924(c) convictions where the defendant 
— on two separate occasions — brandished a gun once to 
commit both Hobbs Act robbery and a drug trafficking crime 
simultaneously); United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1107 
(10th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (vacating one of two § 924(c) 
convictions where the defendant shot a gun once and the bullet 
hit two victims, killing one and injuring the other); United 
States v. Cureton, 739 F.3d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(involving a single act of pressing a gun to the victim’s head in 
making both an extortion and ransom request).   
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C. 
Hodge contends that Counts 6, 7, and 8, the Virgin 
Islands counts related to the use of an unlicensed firearm in 
violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a), are multiplicitous because all 
three charges were predicated upon crimes committed with the 
same firearm during one continuous act.  Hodge Br. 56-57.  
Hodge bases his contention on two theories:  first, that 14 
V.I.C. § 2253(a) only allows for one prosecution where there 
was one firearm used in a continuous act, and second, 14 V.I.C. 
§ 104 forbids multiple punishments for the same action.  Both 
theories have merit. 
 
The Virgin Islands firearms statute criminalizes the 
unauthorized possession, bearing, transporting, or carrying of 
a firearm.  It imposes additional penalties if the defendant also 
commits a “crime of violence.”  In Hodge’s case, the three 
counts under section 2253(a) charge multiple predicate crimes 
of violence against Powell.  Hodge asserts that only one count 
under section 2253(a) is permissible because he only possessed 
the firearm once.  We must therefore determine whether a 
separate offense arises under section 2253(a) for each crime of 
violence during which a firearm was present, or for each 
instance of possessing, bearing, transporting or carrying the 
firearm, regardless of how many crimes of violence are 
committed (which is what Hodge urges us to conclude).  To 
determine what the unit of prosecution is, we first look to the 
text of the statute.  See Kennedy, 682 F.3d at 255. 
 
 We agree with Hodge and hold that the plain text of the 
statute indicates that the unit of prosecution refers to the fact 
that a defendant “has, possesses, bears, transports or carries” 
an unauthorized firearm.  This is a crucial difference between 
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14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  The former 
criminalizes the unauthorized possession of a firearm for any 
purpose.  The latter, in contrast, criminalizes the use, carrying, 
or possession of a firearm only if it is in furtherance of certain 
prescribed activity — here, a crime of violence.  In the absence 
of a crime of violence, Hodge would not face a § 924(c) charge 
at all.  He would still face, however, a charge under 14 V.I.C. 
§ 2253(a) for possession of an unauthorized firearm.   
 
The language of section 2253(a) regarding a crime of 
violence is structured as a sentencing enhancement and 
attaches to the possession offense in the previous clause.  See 
14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) (referencing “if such firearm” being “under 
the proximate control of such person during the commission or 
attempted commission of a crime of violence” (emphasis 
added)).  In other words, Hodge already violated 14 V.I.C. 
§ 2253(a) by virtue of possessing an unauthorized firearm, 
even if he did nothing else.  His commission of a crime of 
violence can only enhance the sentence, and cannot serve as 
the basis for another prosecution for a firearms possession 
offense under section 2253(a).  See United States v. Xavier, 2 
F.3d 1281, 1291 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[Section 2253] provides 
punishment for unauthorized possession ‘except that’ a greater 
punishment applies for a defendant convicted of possessing a 
weapon during a crime of violence.”); see also Fontaine, 697 
F.3d at 229 (“It is thus the lack of authorization to have a 
firearm that stands as a prerequisite to criminal liability [under 
section 2253(a)].”).  The plain meaning of the statute leads us 
to the conclusion that only one count under 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) 
can be sustained under the facts of this case.   
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Moreover, 14 V.I.C. § 104 also forbids Hodge’s 
multiple convictions under section 2253(a).  Section 104 
provides:  
 
An act or omission which is made punishable in 
different ways by different provisions of this 
Code may be punished under any of such 
provisions, but in no case may it be punished 
under more than one. An acquittal or conviction 
and sentence under any one bars a prosecution 
for the same act or omission under any other. 
 
While the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects criminal 
defendants against multiple prosecutions or punishments for a 
single offense,” section 104 “speaks to multiple punishments 
for the same act.”  Castillo v. People, 59 V.I. 240, 284 n.1 
(2013) (Hodge, C.J., concurring).  Section 104 thus “provides 
greater protections than the Double Jeopardy Clause” and 
“dictates that despite the fact that an individual can be charged 
and found guilty of violating multiple provisions of the Virgin 
Islands Code arising from a single act or omission, that 
individual can ultimately be punished for only one offense.”  
Estick v. People, 62 V.I. 604, 620-21 (2015); see also Williams 
v. People, 56 V.I. 821, 821 n.9 (2012).  We agree with Hodge 
that section 104 prevents multiple punishments under Counts 
6, 7, and 8, all of which arise from a single act of having, 
possessing, bearing, transporting, or carrying an unauthorized 
firearm.  See 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a).   
 
Although the District Court imposed a general sentence 
for Counts 6 through 8, a “second conviction, whose 
concomitant sentence is served concurrently, does not 
evaporate simply because of the concurrence of the sentence.”  
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Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985).  Rather, 
“[t]he separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, 
has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be 
ignored. . . . Thus, the second conviction, even if it results in 
no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment.”  Id. at 
865 (noting the collateral consequences of deferred eligibility 
for parole, enhanced sentencing for recidivists for future 
offenses, social stigma, and impeachment of credibility); see 
also United States v. Ward, 626 F.3d 179, 185 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“To the extent [our previous] cases can be read as 
permitting a general sentence on multiple convictions to cure a 
Double Jeopardy problem, the Supreme Court has since 
rejected such an approach.” (citing Rutledge v. United States, 
517 U.S. 292, 307 (1996)).  We will therefore remand to the 
District Court to vacate two of the three convictions in Counts 
6, 7, and 8.  See United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 74 (3d 
Cir. 2008).11 
 
D. 
Hodge asserts that separate punishments for Count 7, a 
14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) offense predicated on the offense of first 
degree assault, and Count 9, the predicate offense of first 
                                              
11 Hodge also argues that his convictions under Counts 6 and 7 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because Count 7’s 
predicate offense of first degree assault with intention to kill 
under 14 V.I.C. § 295(1) is the same offense as Count 6’s 
predicate offense of attempted first degree murder under 14 
V.I.C. §§ 921, 922(a)(2), and 331.  Because we have already 
determined that Virgin Islands law allows only one of Counts 
6, 7, and 8 to remain, we need not reach this argument. 
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degree assault, are not permissible under 14 V.I.C. § 104.  He 
argues that because the predicate offense in Count 9 and the 
firearms offense in Count 7 arose from the “same act or 
omission,” section 104 prevents him from being sentenced for 
both counts.12  
 
We disagree.  Hodge has already conceded in the 
proceedings below that “a conviction for a violation of 14 
V.I.C. § 2253(a) . . . [and a predicate felony] are not 
multiplicitous, and that the local Legislature intended that the 
penalty for this crime should be in addition to the predicate 
felony.”   Hodge Sentencing Mem., (D. Ct. Dkt. 77, Feb. 18, 
2015) at 3.  Indeed, the statute explicitly provides that penalties 
“shall be in addition to” penalties for the predicate offense.  14 
V.I.C. § 2253(a).  The Virgin Islands Supreme Court has 
already ruled that section 2253(a)’s consecutive sentencing 
mandate does not conflict with section 104.  Phillip v. People, 
58 V.I. 569, 594-95 (2013) (citing Ward v. People, 58 V.I. 277, 
286 (2013)); see also Fontaine v. People, 62 V.I. 643, 653-54 
(2015).  The court reasoned that “the Legislature intended to 
establish an exception to the general rule set forth in section 
104, and allow individuals to be punished for both violating 
[the firearms offense] and the underlying crime of violence.”  
Ward, 58 V.I. at 286.  Therefore, because there was “a clear 
and unambiguous intent on the part of the Legislature . . . to 
                                              
12 This issue will be moot, however, if the District Court on 
remand vacates Count 7 pursuant to section II(C), supra.  It is 
also unclear why Hodge only advanced this argument as to 
Counts 7 and 9, but not as to Counts 8 and 11, where the Virgin 
Islands firearms offense charged in Count 8 is predicated on 
the first degree robbery of Powell charged in Count 11. 
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require punishment for both of those offenses,” statutes such 
as section 2253(a) do not conflict with section 104.  Id. 
 
E. 
Hodge argues that the District Court did not heed the 
requirements of 14 V.I.C. § 104 when it imposed a five-year 
general sentence for Counts 9, 11, 14, and 15, but failed to stay 
the execution of punishment for all but one of the counts.  The 
Government contends that the sentences for these counts do not 
fall under the purview of section 104 because they relate to 
multiple acts and multiple victims.   
 
We agree with the Government.  While Hodge is correct 
that section 104 requires not only that a concurrent sentence be 
imposed for related convictions, but also that the executions of 
punishment for all but one conviction arising from the same 
criminal act be stayed, see Williams, 56 V.I. at 821 n.9, there 
is no basis for doing so in this case because the multiple 
convictions for those four counts do not implicate section 104. 
 
While the District Court appeared to consider section 
104 generally during sentencing, it did not explicitly state that 
it was grouping together the four counts under section 104.  
App. 146 (imposing a five-year sentence on Counts 9, 11, 14, 
and 15 without reference to section 104); App. 133 (noting 
prior to imposing a sentence that, in general, “[t]he Court’s 
position is to stay within the confines of . . . [section] 104”).  
Regardless of the court’s intent, section 104 does not apply 
here because the four counts could not “aris[e] from a single 
act or omission.”  Estick, 62 V.I. at 621.  The Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court has held that a “multiple-victim exception” to 
section 104 applies when there is “an act of violence that harms 
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or risks harming more than one person.”  Phillip, 58 V.I. at 593; 
see also Woodrup v. People, 63 V.I. 696, 723 (2015); Fontaine, 
62 V.I. at 654.  In Phillip, the court held that section 104 does 
not apply to convictions for first degree murder and first degree 
reckless endangerment, where the defendant’s shooting of the 
gun killed a victim and “the act of firing created a risk of death 
to others” near the victim.  58 V.I. at 594.  Here, Count 14, first 
degree assault of Bougouneau, relates to a different victim than 
Counts 9 (first degree assault of Powell) and 10 (first degree 
robbery of Powell).  Count 15, first degree reckless 
endangerment, related to yet other victims in the vicinity.   
 
A different question remains as to whether Counts 9 and 
10 (where Powell is the victim for both counts) arose from the 
same act under section 104.  We hold that they do not, since 
the assault and robbery were distinct acts where Hodge 
discharged his gun multiple times, with some break in the 
sequence.  In Galloway v. People, 57 V.I. 693, 712 (2012), the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court held that the defendant’s 
convictions and sentences for driving under the influence and 
failure to stop at a red light did not violate section 104 because 
“his convictions for both offenses were not part of an 
indivisible state of mind or coincident error of judgment.”  
Similarly, Hodge’s decision to use his gun multiple times to 
assault and rob Powell was not “part of an indivisible state of 
mind.”  See also Francis v. People, 63 V.I. 724, 743 (2015) 
(holding that two counts of aggravated rape do not arise from 
the same act under section 104 because each can be 
“considered separately as two units of prosecution”); Webster 
v. People, 60 V.I. 666, 682 n.7 (2014) (holding that defendant’s 
“actions in waking his mother to demand the keys and later 
taking the vehicle without her consent do not constitute ‘a 
single act or omission’ for the purposes of 14 V.I.C. § 104”).   
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Thus, we hold that the District Court did not violate 
section 104 when it imposed a general sentence upon Hodge 
for his convictions on Counts 9, 11, 14, and 15.   
 
III. 
Hodge contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were 
violated because the District Court denied his request for 
substitute counsel.  We review a District Court’s denial of a 
request for substitution of counsel and denial of a continuance 
for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 
1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Kikumura, 947 
F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
A criminal defendant has a right to be assisted by 
counsel of choice under the Sixth Amendment.  The right to 
counsel of choice, however, has limits.  “[W]hen that choice 
comes into conflict with a trial judge’s discretionary power to 
deny a continuance, the court will apply a balancing test to 
determine if the trial judge acted fairly and reasonably.”  
Kikumura, 947 F.2d at 78. 
 
Here, Hodge formally moved for a change of counsel 
moments before trial was scheduled to begin.  The procedure 
for entertaining a substitution of counsel motion on the eve of 
trial is set forth in United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 
(3d Cir. 1982): 
 
[T]he district court must engage in two lines of 
inquiry. First, the court must decide if the 
reasons for the defendant’s request for substitute 
counsel constitute good cause and are thus 
sufficiently substantial to justify a continuance 
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of the trial in order to allow new counsel to be 
obtained.  If the district court determines that the 
defendant is not entitled to a continuance in order 
to engage new counsel, the defendant is then left 
with a choice between continuing with his 
existing counsel or proceeding to trial pro se, 
thus bringing into play the court’s second stage 
of inquiry. 
 
The Welty court then provided examples of good cause, “such 
as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in 
communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with his 
attorney.”  Id. at 188; see also Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098.   
 
Hodge’s argument is only as to the first line of inquiry 
set forth in Welty.  He contends that the District Court’s failure 
to engage in a direct colloquy with him when examining the 
reasons for change of counsel was constitutional error.  We 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying the request without engaging in a direct colloquy with 
Hodge.   
 
Our precedents after Welty command that “[e]ven when 
the trial judge suspects that the defendant’s contentions are 
disingenuous, and motives impure, a thorough and searching 
inquiry is required.”  McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 
942 (3d Cir. 1987).  Although the District Court’s Welty step 
one inquiry in this case was directed at Hodge’s original 
attorney instead of Hodge himself, Hodge has not 
demonstrated that this was an abuse of discretion.  Jupiter, 
Hodge’s public defender, confirmed that he had no conflict of 
interest with any party or witness, that there had been no 
breakdown of communication between himself and his client, 
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and that in fact, the two were still communicating.  Hodge was 
present during this conversation and could have requested to 
be heard.  He could have also spoken on this issue when the 
court asked him later about his understanding of his right to 
proceed pro se.  Finally, his proposed substitute counsel, 
Joseph, was also present, given an opportunity to speak, and 
did not dispute Jupiter’s version of events.  Even now, Hodge 
has advanced no legitimate reason for his desire to substitute 
counsel justifying a continuance.   
 
We do note that by only gathering information from 
counsel whom a defendant wishes to reject, but not the 
defendant himself, a trial court creates some risk of 
overlooking some latent, legitimate reason for substitution that 
is not articulable by his counsel.  There is some support for this 
position in Welty, where we noted:  “[i]f the reasons are made 
known to the court, the court may rule without more.  If no 
reasons are stated, the court then has a duty to inquire into the 
basis for the client’s objection to counsel and should withhold 
a ruling until reasons are made known.”  Welty, 674 F.2d at 
188 (quoting Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. 
Cir. 1959) (en banc) (Burger, J., concurring in part)).  
However, it is not the case that a trial court must ceaselessly 
pursue the inquiry until some satisfactory reason is given, since 
the very purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether any 
such reason exists.   
 
Nor do we agree with Hodge that the failure to conduct 
a one-on-one colloquy with the defendant is itself reversible 
error.13  This Court did not hold in Welty that such a colloquy 
                                              
13 Moreover, the District Court is required to consider 
“countervailing governmental interests” when faced with a last 
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between the judge and the defendant is required in every 
instance, and we do not require that now.  Such a per se 
requirement would be encroaching into the province of the trial 
judge.  We recognize that the District Court can ascertain 
whether good cause exists by using various sources, and we 
decline to require that in every instance, it must question the 
defendant directly.  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the motion to substitute counsel. 
 
IV. 
Hodge challenges the District Court’s refusal to strike 
three prospective jurors for cause.  In particular, Hodge claims 
that two of the prospective jurors knew the shooting victims 
and the third harbored bias because her father had been 
murdered.  “We review the district court’s conduct of voir dire 
for abuse of discretion.”  Butler v. City of Camden, City Hall, 
352 F.3d 811, 814 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003).   
                                              
minute request for substitution of counsel and a continuance.  
Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098.  Joseph asked that opening 
statements take place the following morning.  Although the 
requested continuance was a short one, it nevertheless risked 
disrupting the court’s administration.  The District Court also 
observed that Joseph was not fully ready for trial, after Joseph 
represented that he had received discovery materials from 
Jupiter just days before and would have preferred an extra 
week.  For this additional reason, the District Court’s balancing 
of various factors, including “the efficient administration of 
criminal justice; the accused’s rights, including the opportunity 
to prepare a defense; and the rights of other defendants 
awaiting trial who may be prejudiced by a continuance,” id., to 
deny substitution was not an abuse of discretion. 
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Hodge does not advance any claim that any of the jurors 
who were actually empaneled were biased, and therefore this 
claim fails.  We need not reach the question of whether the 
three potential jurors should have been stricken for cause 
because Hodge exercised his peremptory strikes, and none 
ultimately served on the jury.  “So long as the jury that sits is 
impartial . . . the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory 
challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth 
Amendment was violated.”  United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 
528 U.S. 304, 313 (2000) (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
81, 88 (1988)).  Thus, Hodge cannot prevail.   
 
V. 
We next turn to Hodge’s trial-evidence related 
challenges on appeal. 
 
A. 
Hodge first argues that the testimony of eyewitness 
Officer Schneider, in which she referred to her knowledge of 
him as unemployed, was irrelevant and prejudicial.  He also 
challenges the Government’s closing statement, which referred 
to this aspect of Schneider’s testimony.14   
 
We hold that the admission of Schneider’s testimony 
was not plain error.  Schneider, who was an off-duty police 
                                              
14 We review for plain error when, as here, there is no 
contemporaneous objection to admission of evidence or 
counsel’s comments about evidence during a summation.  
Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 832 F.3d 170, 192 n.12 
(3d Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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officer and an eyewitness to the crime, identified Hodge and 
testified as to the basis of her knowledge of Hodge’s identity.  
She stated that when she first saw Hodge at the shopping 
center, she noticed him because she knew him to be someone 
who frequented the area, and that she recalled thinking he may 
have obtained employment.  Admission of this testimony was 
not erroneous as it increased the probative value of Schneider’s 
correct identification of Hodge, which was also the critical 
issue of fact in this case.  Moreover, even if admission of the 
testimony were in error, the error was not plain because it was 
not “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable 
dispute.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. 
 
Relatedly, the prosecutor’s reiteration of Schneider’s 
testimony during closing statements does not constitute a basis 
for reversal.  Nothing that the prosecutor said fell outside the 
scope of Schneider’s testimony, and re-presentation of the 
testimony was not inappropriate in this case.  Indeed, it is 
fundamental that counsel presenting a summation is free to 
repeat the evidence and even “argue reasonable inferences 
from the evidence,” as long as counsel refrains from misstating 
the evidence.  United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 306 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 784 
(6th Cir. 2001)).  Hodge has not demonstrated any plain error, 
and therefore this claim fails. 
 
B. 
Hodge next argues that there was insufficient evidence 
of premeditation to convict him of Counts 3 and 6, firearms 
offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a), 
respectively.  Both Counts 3 and 6 contain as the predicate 
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offense the crime of violence of attempted murder.  Hodge was 
acquitted of Count 5 (attempted first degree murder of Powell). 
 
When faced with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge, “[w]e review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government.  We do not reweigh the evidence 
or assess witness credibility.”  United States v. McKee, 506 
F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2007).  Therefore, “our inquiry is limited 
to determining whether the jury’s verdict is permissible.”  Id. 
at 233.  To do so, we ask whether “a rational trier of fact could 
have found [the] defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.”  Id. at 
232 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Coyle, 63 
F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 
Hodge’s challenge focuses exclusively on the 
sufficiency of the trial evidence as to the element of 
premeditation in the attempted murder predicate of the 
firearms offenses in Counts 3 and 6.  He argues the trial 
evidence does not support that he “planned and reflected” on a 
killing.  Hodge Br. 61 (quoting Brown v. People, 54 V.I. 496, 
507 (2010)).  We disagree.  Premeditation is almost always 
proven through circumstantial evidence.  In this case, the jury 
could have reasonably inferred premeditation from Hodge’s 
preparation and use of a firearm.15  Indeed, in Brown, the court 
held: 
                                              
15 Evidence that Hodge sought to conceal his involvement in 
the attempted murder and robberies by hiding in the bushes and 
shedding his clothing also support the verdict.  Contrary to 
Hodge’s contention, we have held that conduct after the 
commission of a crime can support a finding of premeditation.  
See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Roldan, 612 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 
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It is not required, however, that the accused shall 
have brooded over his plan to kill or entertained 
it for any considerable period of time.  Although 
the mental processes involved must take place 
prior to the killing, a brief moment of thought 
may be sufficient to form a fixed, deliberate 
design to kill. 
 
Brown, 54 V.I. at 507 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gov’t of 
the V.I. v. Martinez, 780 F.2d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 1985)); see 
also Gov’t of the V.I. v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 411 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“A brief moment of thought can be sufficient. Based on 
the use of a knife and the absence of any provocation or display 
of emotion by [the defendant], the jury could reasonably infer 
that [the defendant], in this brief moment, formulated a 
deliberate intent to kill [the victim].”).   
 
For these reasons, Hodge’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge fails. 
 
VI. 
Hodge also challenges several components of the jury 
charge.  First, Hodge argues that the jury instructions as to 
Counts 3 and 6 were erroneous because in describing the 
predicate offense of attempted murder, the District Court did 
not give a separate definition of attempted murder, did not 
specifically reference Counts 5 and 12 as the predicate crimes, 
and did not reference specific victims.  In the alternative, he 
                                              
1979) (noting that evidence that the defendant attempted to 
conceal the victim’s body and the murder weapon and lied to 
law enforcement supported a verdict of premeditated murder). 
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argues that even if the jury instructions on Counts 3 and 6 were 
adequate, the instructions on Count 5 were insufficient because 
they did not contain a definition of “willfully” or 
“deliberately.” 
 
Hodge contends that the District Court erred by 
providing confusing jury instructions for Counts 3 and 6.  He 
principally argues that the District Court (1) did not give a 
definition of attempted murder when discussing the elements 
of these offenses which were predicated on attempted murder, 
(2) did not reference where in the Information the attempted 
murder charge could be found, and (3) did not specify to which 
victim these attempted murders referred.  
 
Hodge has failed to identify any error.16  The District 
Court defined attempted murder when instructing the jury on 
Counts 5 and 12 and was not required to repeat the definition 
each time attempted murder was mentioned as an element of a 
crime.  A jury is presumed to follow the instructions given by 
the judge, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987), and 
as such, we presume the jury followed the District Court’s 
instructions as to attempted murder in both its direct iteration 
in Counts 5 and 12 as well as upon successive reference in 
other counts. 
 
The second and third arguments are also without merit, 
and we identify no error in the Court’s instructions.  The 
District Court’s instructions for Count 3 and 4 (§ 924(c) counts 
                                              
16 Moreover, as the District Court noted, Hodge did not raise 
these objections at trial.  See D. Ct. Op. (D. Ct. Dkt. 101, Apr. 
15, 2016) at 33; Hodge Mot. to Vacate, (D. Ct. Dkt. No. 89, 
Jun. 24, 2015) at 2.  
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based on the attempted murders of Powell and Bougouneau, 
respectively) specified that the Government must prove that 
“the defendant committed an attempted murder as charged in 
either Counts 5 or 12 of the information.”  App. 90.  While the 
District Court repeated the instructions for Counts 3 and 4 
moments later and did not refer to Counts 5 and 12 in the 
second reading, the totality of the instructions gave jurors 
sufficient guidance based on the law.  United States v. Leahy, 
445 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen we consider jury 
instructions we consider the totality of the instructions and not 
a particular sentence or paragraph in isolation.” (quoting 
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995))), 
abrogated on other grounds by Loughrin v. United States, 134 
S. Ct. 2384 (2014). 
 
Similarly, although the District Court did not again refer 
to Counts 5 and 12 in giving instructions for Counts 6 and 13 
(14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) firearms counts based on the attempted 
murders of Powell and Bougouneau, respectively), Hodge has 
identified no authority requiring that the court do so.  There 
was only evidence of two victims of attempted murder, and 
Hodge was prosecuted for the attempted murders of both.  The 
Counts in the Information where the attempted murders were 
charged were already stated to the jury.  We therefore conclude 
that Hodge’s challenges to the jury instructions for Counts 3 
and 6 are meritless. 
 
A. 
Hodge argues in the alternative that the jury instructions 
for Count 5 (attempted murder of Powell) should have 
contained definitions of “willful” and “deliberate” in order for 
the jury properly to convict him on Counts 3 and 6, the firearms 
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offenses predicated on attempted murder.  He acknowledges 
that the District Court did define “premeditated,” but alleges 
error in the failure to define “willful” and “deliberate.”17   
 
This argument does not survive plain error review.  
Even if we assume the premise that the District Court 
committed error in not defining those two terms, we could not 
characterize such error as plain or affecting substantial rights.  
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 2005).  It 
is hard to reconcile how a crime could be premeditated — 
“conceive[d] the design or plan to kill” — and not be 
“deliberate” or “willful” about the act of attempted killing.  In 
other words, when viewed in its totality, the jury instructions 
provided jurors with sufficient basis for evaluating the 
elements of attempted murder with the proper understanding 
of the element of intent required for conviction.    
 
 Hodge is correct that we have defined deliberateness 
with more detail in the past.  Martinez, 780 F.2d at 305 (“A 
deliberate killing is one which has been planned and reflected 
upon by the accused and is committed in a cool state of the 
blood, not in sudden passion engendered by just cause of 
provocation.” (quoting Gov’t of the V.I. v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770, 
776 (3d Cir. 1966)).  However, in this case there is no evidence 
regarding provocation or sudden passion.  Therefore, the 
District Court’s decision to omit that language was not plainly 
erroneous.   
                                              
17 Hodge appears to also make the same argument as it relates 
to Count 4 (§ 924(c) charge predicated on attempted murder of 
Bougouneau) and Count 12 (attempted murder of 
Bougouneau).  Since Hodge was acquitted of both those 
counts, we do not address them here. 
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VII. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence on Counts 1, 2, 
and 3.  We will also affirm the District Court’s judgment and 
commitment, except that we will remand to the District Court 
to vacate two of the three offenses charged in Counts 6, 7, and 
8. 
 
